Options management motivation


Stock options were just a footnote. Now the reverse is true. With astounding speed, stock option grants have come to dominate the pay—and often the wealth—of top executives throughout the United States. Michael Eisner exercised 22 million options on Disney stock in alone, netting more than a half-billion dollars. In total, U. It would be difficult to exaggerate how much the options explosion has changed corporate America. But has the change been for the better or for the worse? Certainly, option grants have improved the fortunes of many individual executives, entrepreneurs, software engineers, and investors.

Their long-term impact on business in general remains much less clear, however. Option grants are even more controversial for many outside observers. The grants seem to shower ever greater riches on top executives, with little options management motivation to corporate performance.

They appear to offer great upside rewards with little downside risk. And, according to some very vocal critics, they motivate corporate leaders to pursue short-term moves that provide immediate boosts to stock values rather than build companies that will thrive over the options management motivation run.

By Ryan Barnes Updated Jun 25, It is an often-overlooked truth, but the ability for investors to accurately see what is going on at a company and to be able to compare companies based on the same metrics is one of the most vital parts of investing. The debate about how to account for corporate stock options given to employees and executives has been argued in the media, company boardroomsand even in the U. A Short History of the Stock Option as Compensation The practice of giving out stock options to company employees is decades old. In this instance, intrinsic value is defined as the difference between the grant price and the market price options management motivation the stock, which at the time of grant would be equal. So, while the practice of not recording any costs for stock options began long ago, the number being handed out was so small that a lot of people ignored it.

As the use of stock options has begun to expand internationally, such concerns have spread from the United States to the business centers of Europe and Asia. Options do not promote a selfish, near-term perspective on the part of businesspeople. Quite the contrary.

Options are the best compensation mechanism we have for getting managers to act in ways that ensure the long-term options management motivation of their companies and the well-being of their workers and stockholders. Stock options are bafflingly complex financial instruments. As a result, companies often end up having option programs that are counterproductive.

I have, for example, seen many Silicon Valley companies continue to use their pre-IPO programs—with unfortunate consequences—after the companies have grown and gone public.

The Downside Risk

The Pay-to-Performance Link The main goal in granting stock options is, of course, to tie pay options management motivation performance—to ensure that executives profit when their companies prosper and suffer when they flounder. Many critics claim that, in practice, option grants have not fulfilled that goal. Executives, they argue, continue to be rewarded as handsomely for failure as for success.

As evidence, they either use anecdotes—examples of poorly performing companies that compensate their top managers extravagantly—or they cite studies indicating that the total pay of executives in charge of high-performing companies is not much different from the pay of those heading poor performers.

The studies are another matter. Virtually all of them share a fatal flaw: they measure only the compensation earned in a given year.

As executives at a company receive yearly option grants, they begin to amass large amounts of stock and unexercised options. When the shifts in value of the overall quick earnings vk are taken into account, the link between pay and performance becomes much clearer. By increasing the number of shares executives control, option grants have dramatically strengthened the link between pay and performance.

For both measures, the link between pay and performance has increased nearly tenfold since Tying Pay to Performance Given the complexity of options, though, it is reasonable to ask a simple question: if the goal is to align the incentives of owners and managers, why not just hand out shares of stock?

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The answer is that options provide far greater leverage. For a company with an average dividend yield and a stock options management motivation that exhibits average volatility, a single stock option is worth only about one-third of the value of a share.

options management motivation

The company can therefore give an executive three times as many options as shares for the same cost. In addition to providing leverage, options offer accounting advantages. The accounting treatment of options has generated enormous controversy. On the other side are many executives, especially those in small companies, who counter that options are difficult to value properly and that expensing them would discourage their use.

Hibiki Message

The response of institutional investors to the special treatment of options has been relatively muted. They have not been as critical as one might expect. There are two reasons for this. First, companies are required to list their option expenses in a footnote to the balance sheet, so savvy investors can easily figure option costs into expenses. Even more important, activist shareholders have been among the most options management motivation in pushing companies to replace cash pay with options.

In my view, the worst thing about the current accounting rules is not that they allow companies to avoid listing options as an expense. That discourages companies from experimenting with new kinds of plans. As just one example, the accounting rules penalize discounted, indexed options—options options management motivation an exercise price that is initially set beneath the current stock price and that varies according to a general or industry-specific stock-market index.

Although indexed options are attractive because they isolate company performance from broad stock-market trends, they are almost nonexistent, in large part because the accounting rules dissuade companies from even considering them.

The idea of using leveraged incentives is not new. Most salespeople, for example, are paid a higher commission rate on the revenues options management motivation generate above a certain target. Such plans are more difficult to administer than plans with a single commission rate, options management motivation when it comes to compensation, the advantages of leverage often outweigh the disadvantages of complexity.

You also have to impose penalties for weak performance. The critics options management motivation options have unlimited upside but no downside. The implicit assumption is that options have no value when granted and that the recipient thus has nothing to lose. But that assumption is completely false. Options do have value.

options management motivation

Just look at the financial exchanges, where options on stock are bought and sold for large sums of money every second. Yes, the value of option grants is illiquid and, yes, the eventual payoff is contingent on the future performance of the company.

Do Stock Options Work as an Employee Incentive?

But they have value nonetheless. And if something has value that can be lost, it has, by definition, downside risk. In fact, options have even greater downside risk than stock.

Consider two executives in the same company.

options management motivation

One is granted a million dollars worth of stock, and the other is granted a million dollars worth of at-the-money options—options whose exercise price matches the stock price at the time of the grant. The executive with options, however, has essentially been wiped out. His options are now so far under water that they are nearly worthless.

The Benefits and Value of Stock Options

Far from eliminating penalties, options actually amplify them. The downside risk has become increasingly evident to executives as their pay packages have come to be dominated by options. Take a look at options management motivation employment contract Joseph Galli negotiated with Amazon. The risk inherent in options can be undermined, however, through the practice of repricing.

When a stock price falls sharply, the issuing company can be tempted to reduce the exercise price of previously granted options in order to increase their value for the executives who hold them. Although fairly common in small companies—especially those in Silicon Valley—option repricing is relatively rare for senior options management motivation of large companies, despite some well-publicized exceptions.

Again, however, the criticism does not stand up to close examination.

The Pay-to-Performance Link

For a method of compensation to motivate managers to focus on the long term, it needs to be tied to a performance measure that looks forward rather than backward. The traditional measure—accounting profits—fails that test.

I have always been a big fan of stock compensation, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry recently came out in favor of restricted stock.

It measures the past, not the future. Stock price, however, is a forward-looking measure. Forecasts can never be completely accurate, of course.